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Republic of Tunisia.OLIVE OIL PRICE POLICY IN TUNISIA
by
Osama A. A1-Zand*
In terms of value added, olive oil is one of the most important
agricultural commodities in Tunisia. It is also the
agricultural export commodity. Tunisia ranks second
olive oil exports. Currently, these exports account
most important
to Spain in world
for about 20 percent
of total export earnings of Tunisia. This is equivalent to about 40
percent of total agricultural export earnings. Tunisia is by far the
largest olive oil producing country in North Africa and the Middle East
and ranks sixth among the world’s producers of olive oil.
Considering the adaptability of the olive tree to the climatic and
soil conditions of Tunisia, olive culture is expected to maintain its
importance in Tunisian agriculture. Programs to expand tree population
and regeneration of the less productive trees should even increase the
importance of the olive crop in Tunisia’s agricultural sector. However,
the economic benefits which could be derived from the olive oil sector
will be directly affected by national policies regarding marketing and
pricing of the commodity. In particular the role that prices play in
providing necessary incentives to induce technological change in produc-
tion and marketing should not be underestimated.
* Osama A1-Zand is a Research Associate, University of Minnesota Team
in Tunisia. The research reported on in this study was carried out
in Tunisia and supported by U.S.A.I.D. under AID/Afr 469. This study
was carried out in 1969 and prepared for publication in early 1970.2
The objective of this paper is to examine the development of olive
oil pricing policies in Tunisia and certain key assumptions upon which
it is based. This study outlines the principal ideas which may permit
an evaluation of the efficiency of olive oil price policy with respect
to its impact on production, consumption and export of this commodity.
Historically, government regulations which prescribe specific price
level and marketing margins, which are not the outcome of free market









regulate production and market supplies,
maintain an export surplus,
extend commercial marketing,
enforce certain quality standards,
insure government revenue from marketing of the product.
As a part of agricultural development strategy, price policy must
be considered within the context of these objectives. Price policy can
be a tool to achieve development objectives and desired growth rates in
production.
PRICE POLICY DEVELOPMENT FOR OLIVE OIL IN TUNISIA 1957-69
In order to evaluate existing olive oil price policy in Tunisia, it
is important to consider the development of marketing and pricing practices
in recent years. These developments were the outcome of difficulties expe-
rienced in satisfying domestic demand for edible oils at reasonable prices
and at the same time maintaining an olive oil export surplus. Adverse
trends in olive production and the continuous increase in domestic demand,3
as a result of rising income and growing population, have prevented the
maintenance of self-sufficiency and an export surplus in this commodity.
Commercial marketing and pricing of olive oil, up to the early 1960’s,
were largely determined by the size of annual olive production and the
export market situation. Domestic consumption averaged about 35 thousand
metric tons a year. Imports of other soft edible oils were nil. Almost
all edible oil consumption was satisfied through domestic olive oil sup-
plies.
Government intervention in the pricing of olive oil was originally
confined to the fixation of taxes on production and marketing. A govern-
ment guaranteed floor price of 180 dinars per ton was established in 1959
for the purchase of super and extra oils. However, this scheme was little
used since the floor price was considerably below the average wholesale
price achieved in this period.
Nevertheless, Tunisian policy makers felt that several imperfections
existed in the marketing and pricing practices of olive oil. It was argued
that, as a result of imperfect competition, primary producers were being
exploited by dealers, processors and exporters of the commodity. Aggre-
gate supplies for domestic and export markets were allocated mainly by
relatively few middlemen with financially strong bargaining power to pur-
chase, process, transport, and store olive oil in large quantities. The
share of the market in olive oil controlled by those few traders was
believed to be high. This was in sharp contrast with the characteristics
of the Tunisian olive growers where production was in the hands of a large
number of small growers utilizing traditional processing and storage facil-
ities and producing for home consumption as well as for the market.4
Two distinctly separate markets existed~ one for fresh olives as an
intermediate product, and the other for olive oil as a final product.
The majority of small and subsistence olive producers sold to dealers
and processors while the olives were still on the tree (les op~rations
de Khdara). Apparently, the dealers and processors were, for various
reasons,ti able to pay very low prices to farmers at harvest time.
For example, the average selling price of one ton oil-equivalent of
fresh olives on the tree (assuming five tons of olives gives one ton oil)
was approximately 104 dinars, by comparison with the average wholesale
“bourse ,fd price realized of 230 dinars per ton. Even after subtrac-
ting a reasonable amount for the costs of harvesting, processing, han-
dling and taxes which would amount to about 76 dinars per ton of oil,
this would still leave about a 50 dinars margin at the wholesale level
(Table 1) or the equivalent of about 50 percent on the purchase price of
fresh olives. Such prices and profit margins were apparently maintained
by the extreme institutional inequalities in bargaining power between
the subsistence and commercial olive sectors.
As long as these conditions persisted, they resulted in a dual pricing
system for essentially one product i.e., olive oil. Fresh olive prices
f u
2/’
The more important cited were the producer’s need for cash, credit repay-
ments, the perishability of fresh olives and the oligopolistic nature
of the large scale marketing and processing system. Advance sale of
unharvested olives also provides some insurance against the risk of total
loss from crop damage.
Tunisian wholesale “bourse” price is comparable to market exchange price
in the U. S.5
Table 1. - Estimates of farm price and direct cost of processing olive
oil, assuming oil yield of 20 percent of fresh olives crushed.
Production Factor Cost Range Average Cost Average Cost







6d200- 7d100 6d600 33dOO0
2d100 2d100 10d500
Transportation ld200- ld500 ld400 7dOO0
Crushing 4d500- 7dOO0 5dOO0 25dOO0
Total Marketing Cost 14dOO0-17d700 15d100 75d500
Producer price of oil 32dOOO-42d700 36dOO0 180dOO0
Wholesale price (bourse) 230dOO0
Wholesale profit margin 50dOO0
u An additional recent tax on “grignon” (olive paste left after first
pressing for olive oil extraction) of ld412 dinar per ton is not con-
sidered. The grignon as a by-product of olive crushing represents
about 33 percent of olives crushed. Processing ofgrignon oil
for edible and industrial uses is usually carried out by separate
crushing facilities still under private enterprises. Refined edible
oil extracted from the grignon is sold to the government for mixing
purposes at 160 dinars per ton.
Source: (1) Analyse de la Campaqne Ol#icole 1965/66
(2) Cost-Survey of olive oil processing in three modern and
semi-modern olive crushers (June 1969)
(3) Union Centrale des Coop~ratives Ol~icoles.6
were usually determined locally depending on institutional considerations
relating to the size of marketable harvest, its location and the olive
grower’s bargaining power. On the other hand~ olive oil prices were
internationally determined by commercial supply and demand conditions
relating to domestic and foreign markets. In other words, the Tunisian
olive oil market had all the appearance of monopoly price discrimination
arising from institutional and traditional factors separating the two
markets.
The first major change in this long established marketing system
came in August 1962, when a presidential decree authorized the creation
of the National Office of Oil (Office National de l’Huile). This inde-
pendent government agency was placed under the Secretariat of State of
Planning and National Economy. The new office was authorized to admin-
ister a new government policy regarding the edible oil economy of Tunisia?
including olive oil. This development came at a time when it was realized
that the Tunisian olive oil production was no longer adequate to satisfy
increasing domestic demand, at a reasonable price, and to maintain a
sizeable export surplus.
One of the principal objectives of the new agency was to facilitate
and encourage the continuous and stable export of olive oil. Imports of
other cheaper edible oils to satisfy domestic consumption were perceived
as a means of maintaining or increasing exports of higher priced olive
oil. This policy was made feasible by importing substantial quantities
of soybean oil (at about half of the international price of olive oil)
from the U.S. under confessional trade agreement.7
Olive oil marketing and export continued to remain essentially“free”
except that the exporter was obliged to deliver to the National Office of
Oil 30 percent of the quantity of olive oil they exported (reduced to 20
percent after September 1966). Quantities received under this provision
2/ were used for blended oil sold in the domestic market . The producer’s
floor price for oil remained fixed at the previously established 1959
level of 180 dinar per ton for super and extra oil.
Heavy imports of soybean oil from the United States under the Food
for Peace Program started in 1962/63. These imports have enabled Tunisia
to increase its consumption of
average of 31 thousand tons in
ton in the preceding six years
cheap soybean and other seed oils to an
1962-68 compared with only one thousand
(Table 2). The new level of seed oil
consumption now accounts for about 60 percent of total edible oils con-
sumed in the country. However, as a result of low production Tunisia’s
olive oil exports did not increase but have actually declined by an
average of 7 thousand metric tons in the 1962-68 period in comparison
with earlier six years. Nevertheless, average olive oil exports as a
percent of production have increased by about 5 percent. It is evident
that in the absence of seed oil imports from the U.S., olive oil exports
would have been considerably lower.
y
Imported edible oils (and primarily soybean oil from the U.S.) are
blended with the acquired olive oil. The Tunisian National Office
of Oil controls the blending and marketing operations. Various
blend proportions are used depending on the quantities available of
each oil in any particular year. The oil blend is sold through
retail outlets in urban centers at a fixed price of 200 millimes
per liter. The implications of oil blending and pricing practices
will be reviewed in later report.Table 2. - Production, consumption and export of olive oil and seed oil in
Tunisia, 1956/57 to 1967/6~J
Thousand Metric Tons
Prod. Consumpt. Consumpt. Consumpt. Export Export
Season olive olive seed edible olive % of
oil oil oils oils oil prod.
1956/57 90 34 1 35 30 33
1957/58 50 35 1 36 36 72
1958/59 132 36 1 37 70 53
1959/60 12 36 1 37 23 192
1960/61 125 40 1 41 42 34
1961/62 34 36 2 38 56 165
196 2/6 3 45 18 24 42 29 64
1963/64 89 23 19 42 43 48
1964/65 95 25 19 44 53 56
196 5/66 52 25 34 59 43 83
1966/67 20 15 48 63 18 90
1967/68 51 20 42 62 32 63
1956/57-1961/62 74 36 1 37 43 58
(average)
1962/63-1967/68 59 21 31 52 36 61
(average)
Averaqe Chanqe -15 -15 +30 +15 -7 +5
&/IJnited states p~bli~ La~480 shiPment of soYbean oil to Tunisia started in
1962/63.
Source: Union Centrale des Cooperatives Ol~icoles and other official sources.9
In summary, apart from taxatioJ4 and the nominal floor price and various
other minor measures to encourage exports, government intervention in the
pricing and marketing of olive oil was minimal during the early 1960’s.
Domestic and export marketing of olive oil essentially remained free. How-
ever, in response to olive oil production deficits of 1962/63 accompanied
by greater demand for edible oil, the National Office of Oil was authorized
to import cheaper oils in an effort to supply domestic oil consumption and
to maintain the flow of olive oil exports. Imported oils blended with olive
oil, at various proportions, were made available for local consumers at a
considerably low price. As a result, olive oil exports were maintained at
the 1960 levels despite some poor production years.
PRESENT PRICE POLICY (Beqinninq 1967)
In 1967 several new actions were taken by the National Office of OilY
designed to improve the marketing system and to raise the producer’s price.
It was expressed that a first priority was to improve the olive oil mar-
keting and pricing system in order to eliminate believed discrepancies in
the market. Two important actions were taken to achieve this purpose.
First, a fixed producer price (which is comparable to the wholesale price)
d These taxes were numerous and changed considerably over the years. In
1965/66, for example, the taxes on extra quality oil were as follows:
olives production tax 10d500, jumelage 16d077, export taxes 4d227,
exceptional taxes 25d617~ olive oil fund lldOOO. These taxes, in 1965/66,
accounted for about 22 percent of the F.O.B. price of 300 dinars.
ti As of August 1969, the Union Centrale de Coop~rative Ol~icole has replaced
the National Office d’Huile as a regulatory agency as well as the producer’s
organization undertaking all commercial marketing of edible oils in Tunisia.10
was to be announced by the government each marketing year in order to maintain
a guaranteed price for producers (Table 3). The wholesale “bourse” price deter-
mined in the free market prior to June 1967 was replaced by a fixed producer
price. Part of this price was to be paid to the producer as an advance at the
beginning of the olive harvest season and then supplemented with the remaining
price margin at the end of the marketing season. For example, a price advance
of 270 dinars per ton was paid during 1967/68 for oil of ‘extra’ quality sup-
plemented by additional 25 dinars paid at the end of the season. However,
Table 3 also shows that an important price difference between Tunisian whole-
sale prices and international prices (trade price margin) existed throughout
the 1960’s. This margin remained significantly high even after the level of
the domestic wholesale price was increased in 1967. The new price policy
reduced the trade price margin to a level almost equivalent to total taxes
levied on olive oil destined for export markets. The existence of such trade
margins is an indication of the competitiveness of the Tunisian olive oil
industry in comparison with other major olive oil producing countries in the
Mediterranean region.
Second, and perhaps more important, the purchasing of fresh olives on the
tree was made illegal. Presumably this new regulation was designed to eliminate
inequitable pricing methods in the traditional olive growing sector. Also, the
producer price was fixed at a somewhat higher level than the free wholesale
market price achieved before regulation (Table 3).11
Table 3. -Production of olive oil in Tunisia, domestic
international pricej and trade price marqin,
wholesale price~
1961/62-1968/69.









1961/62 34 202 331 129
1962/63 45 295 457 162
1963/64 89 194 309 115
1964/65 96 226 348 122
1965/66 53 240 346 106
1966/67 20 286 362 76
O-J
1
1967/68 UCC 51 295 357 62
1968/69 55 270 355 85
Domestic wholesale pricing of olive oil in Tunisia was taken over by Union
Centrale des Cooperatives Ol&icoles as of June 1967. Wholesale price became
producer price.
The wholesale “bourse” price is comparable to market exchange price in the
U.S.A.
Sources: 1) Union Centraledes Coop~ratives Ol<icoles.
2) FAO Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics.12
In summary, the policy changes of June 1967 were designed to promote a
positive production response from producers by:
1. Assuring primary agricultural producers of olive oil a guaranteed
minimum price. This is paid in the form of a price advance upon
delivery of oil to the National Office of Oil. This could reduce
the uncertainties regarding producer’s income from olive production.
2. Eliminating fresh olive sales on the tree in an effort to integrate
olive production with olive oil market prices and demand.
3. Increasing producer price to a level somewhat higher than prices
achieved in earlier years.
The new price policy of fixing producer price was intended to help primary
producers of olives as well as to exercise greater degree of control over whole-
sale pricing and commercial marketing of olive oil. The annually fixed producer
price, which replaced the former free market wholesale price, is usually set
at the beginning of the olives harvest season. The controlled retail prices
of olive oil and blended oil remained unchanged.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF PRICING AND MARKETING POLICIES
Various key assumptions on which edible oil pricing and marketing policies
are based can be identified. An examination of these implicit assumptions, their
validity and implications, is very critical in formulating appropriate pricing
and marketing decisions for Tunisia.
First, the government decision to import cheaper edible oils, beginning
1962/63, for domestic consumption was apparently conceived as a temporary action
which was taken to supplement deficits in domestic olive oil production. However,
this idea was subsequently modified when the government adopted for the planned13
development of Central and Southern Tunisia the introduction of enterprises
other than olive oil such as livestock, pistachio, almonds and apricots.
Also, it is worth noting that the 1969-72 Development Plan forecasts the
maintenance of some consumption of soft oil at least until 1980, either by
imports or by the domestic production of oilseeds.
Second~ it was assumed that the Tunisian consumer preference for olive
oil in consumption utilization can not be drastically changed. u
This consideration was believed to be the base for the seed oil - olive
oil blending practices. The National Office of Oil marketed oil locally, a
blend, of which a part was olive oil, in order to supply consumers with an
oil which at least retained in part an olive flavor. Experience showed,
however, that it has been possible to accustom the Tunisian consumer to other
oils and notably to soybean oil only lightly cut with olive oil. It is not
impossible that in the future the consumption of pure soft oils could be
introduced into Tunisia which would release further quantities of olive oil
for export.
Third, market imperfections and inequalities were believed to exist
between primary producers of olives and private traders of olive oil. This
is considered as a principal factor which leads to overall marketing control
and producer price fixing by the National Office of Oil. However, there is
no solid evidence to support the theory of market exploitation and/or ineffi-
cienciesin the marketing of olive oil. Additional information about marketing
channels, cost of processing and marketing services and price margins are
needed to be able to confirm that the reduction in the wide margin since 1967
(Table 3) are not attributable to other factors.
(5J’
Prior to 1962-63 seed oils for edible uses were unknown to Tunisian Consumers.14
The sizable difference, shown in this paper, between the prices paid to
primary producers for olives on the tree and the wholesale price of olive oil
produced may provide some evidence of imperfect competition and unequal bargain-
ing power among producers and dealers of the commodity.
its National Office of Oil or the Central Union of Olive




that the UCCO is confronted with tne challenge of marketingolive oil efficiently.
Otherwise, gains to producers may be lost through higher marketing costs. A dis-
tinction should be made in this respect between achieving the goal of economic
efficiencies in marketing and income redistribution within the olive oil sector.
The efficiency of market control has to be tested against that of the previously
“free” market organization to determine the overall gains or losses to the indus-
try.
PRICE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Pricing and price policy are usually determined by various social, political
as well as economic considerations. Since olive oil in Tunisia continues to be
an important food item for domestic consumption and the principal export commo-
dity, the effect of pricing policy must be closely considered. In particular,
the possible impact of price fixing and government marketing control on produc-
tion trends and market supplies of olive oil is important. Also, the effect of
consumer pricing of edible oil on the quantities demanded and the rate of sub-
stitution between olive oil and other lower priced imported oils should not
be overlooked.
Price policy objectives must be defined first from both aspects of domestic
self sufficiency in edible oils and potential olive oil export surplus. For
example, one of the principal objectives of the National Office of Oil and the15
UCCO was to facilitate and encourage a continuous and stable flow of olive oil
exports. This has been difficult to achieve in face of the increasing domestic
demand for edible oils and especially in low olive oil production years. How-
everj olive oil generates far larger earnings as an export commodity than it
does for domestic consumption, since the internal price of olive oil in Tunisia
is significantly lower than the world price and, indeed, of the internal prices
of most other producing countries. This study has shown that both freely de-
termined and controlled wholesale prices of olive oil in Tunisia have been
considerably lower than those in international markets. In this sense Tunisia
has a distinct comparative advantage in the production and export of this com-
modity. This advantage could be further exploited by exporting maximum quan-
tities of olive oil through raising the domestic price to or above the world
price. On the other hand, the requirements for olive oil for domestic consump-
tion, and the desire to maintain a reasonably low internal price level for such
an important food commodity, limits such action. In other words, increased
olive oil exports could have been achieved but only at the expense of a fur-
ther decline in the domestic consumption of olive oil.
The large imports of soybean oil from the United States, under confes-
sional trade agreements, have altered the above situation and brought sig-
nificant changes in the edible oil economy of Tunisia. These imports were
sold in the retail market as a new blended oil at a price equal to one half
of that fixed for pure olive oil. Apparently this considerably lower price
for edible oil has enabled large numbers of low income consumers to increase
their individual consumption of total oils. This is particularly relevant
among urban consumers to whom non-market supplies of olive oil have become
largely unavailable. Consequently, total consumption of edible oils, includ-
ing olive oil, has risen from an average of 37 thousand metric tons in 1956-6116
period to 52 thousand metric tons in 1962-67 period. This was realized despite
an average decline in olive oil production of 15 thousand metric tons during
the same period. Hence, the increase in the use of imported oils not only
offset this decline in domestic olive oil production but actually raised the
level of total edible oil consumption by a further 15 thousand tons. Average
per capita consumption of edible oil had increased from 9 kilos in the first
half of the 1960’s to 12 kilos in the last half. At the same time a reduction
in average total consumption of olive oil has been achieved, which has permitted
somewhat stable exports despite the production decrease of recent years.
The retail price relationship between blended oil and pure olive oil was
fixed at a somewhat arbitrary basis. That is, it was not based on any firm
knowledge of the nature of supply and demand for these interchangeable com-
modities. Prices were set, instead, at certain levels intended to separate
the olive oil market from that of imported oils which were allocated for
domestic consumption. On one hand blended oil price was set at a rather low
level (200 mi.llimesper liter). This resulted in almost doubliug the total
quantities of edible oil consumed over a ten year period. On the other hand,
the retail price of pure olive oil was set at a significantly higher level
than domestic wholesale and export prices (400 millimes per liter in sealed
bottles). This price has effectively banished pure olive oil fram the com-
mercial retail outlets. It is estimated by the National Office of Oil that
only 2 percent of total edible oils utilized in Tunisia is distributed from
commercial retail outlets as pure olive oil. This indicates that almost
all pure olive oil consumed domestically is marketed through unregulated
producer and wholesale channels at lower prices. It is estimated that at
least 60 percent of total olive oil consumed in Tunisia is marketed through17
these channels. Y This situation calls for further examination of the effective-
ness of retail and wholesale price fixing and its impact on consumption and
export of edible oils in Tunisia.
The higher prices received by olive producers in recent years could pro-
vide a positive incentive to increase their production and commercial market-
ing of the commodity. However, a considerable margin still remains between
producer and export prices due to the high level of government taxes on the
production and marketing of olive oil. A reduction in these taxes and in
marketing margins$ and consequently a higher producer price, would assist in
linking olive growing sector with actual price conditions in the domestic and
foreign markets.
In summary, the price fixing developments outlined above have given the
greatest benefit to low income consumers by providing them with low priced
edible oil. This has been achieved through the importation of cheaper edible
oils. It was thought that olive oil supplies could be easily released for
the export market if the consumer price at the retail level is fixed at a
considerably higher level. This was not realized since olive oil was
available in the wholesale and unregulated retail market outlets at a consid-
erably lower price. It is recognized that the basic direction of the Tunisian
policies of increasing producer prices was appropriate. However, the price
increase could have been higher taking into account the value of the com-
modity in the export market. Such higher producer prices may release more
olive oil for commercial and export markets. Opportunities for increasing
producer prices through the reduction of marketing margins, as well as of
taxes and costs, are considerable.
flThe remainder is marketed as a blended oil which is sold Only by the
National Office of Oil.18
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The objective of this paper has been to analyze Tunisian olive oil market-
ing and pricing practices and policies and to evaluate their possible impact
on production~commercial marketing and exports of this commodity. The study
describes the developments in the market operation and organization experienced
in recent years. The implications of changes in market organization pricing
of olive oil and imports of cheaper edible oils for domestic consumption are
analyzed.
Although the merit of a price policy can only be judged within the context
of the overall economic policy followed in the country, the general principles
and factors which affect price determination are examined. The primary emphasis
of current olive oil price policy has been on maintaining a higher degree of
control over the olive oii economy in order to maintain the flow of olive oil
exports and to supplement the domestic needs for edible oils.
While the basic direction of the Tunisian edible oil policies appears to
be economically appropriate, the specific policies with regard to market
organization and price levels are not likely to achieve further significant
changes in the pattern of consumption and/or export surplus potentials par-
ticularly if olive oil production continues to be low. It appears that
Tunisian olive oil pricing policies did not achieve any significant increase
in the commercial marketing of the commodity. This could be explained by the
retail-wholesale price relationship which maintained a considerable margin above
what would seem a reasonable return for marketing services. As a result
almost all olive oil consumed in Tunisia was apparently marketed through19
unregulated and largely unknown marketing channels. In order to assess the
likelihood of alternative policies, we need to know more about the commodity’s
distribution channels, marketing margins and the response of both producers
and consumers to market prices.
Indications are that Tunisia has a comparative advantage in olive oil
production, as Tunisian producer prices remained considerably lower than
export prices. This situation should allow the implementation of a favor-
able producer price policy without a great financial burden to the govern-
ment.
Imports of cheaper seed oils as a substitute for olive oil in domestic
consumption appears to be a continuing feature of the Tunisian oil economy.
In this case the need for an appropriate long term price policy for the two
substitute commodities is urgent. That is, if domestic utilization and
exports of olive oil are to be further manipulated there is need to estab-
lish price policies for seed oil, olive oil and seed oil/olive oil blends
to achieve the desired objectives. Such a study could lead to the conclusion
that further revision of the price fixing and oil blending practices is
needed.
Finally, the potential conflict between price policy objectives must
be recognized. This potential could be minimized by a skillful pricing and
marketing technique based on principles of economic gains to the industry
and to the nation.